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 Enrolment in Ethiopia’s Community Based Health Insurance scheme† 
 
Anagaw Derseha, Robert Sparrowb, Zelalem Yilmac, Getnet Alemud, Arjun S. Bedie 
 
 
Abstract 
In June 2011, the Government of Ethiopia rolled out a pilot Community Based Health 
Insurance (CBHI) scheme. This paper assesses scheme uptake. We examine whether the 
scheme is inclusive, the role of health status in inducing enrolment and the effect of the 
quality of health care on uptake. By December 2012, scheme uptake had reached an 
impressive 45.5 percent of target households. We find that a household’s socioeconomic 
status does not inhibit uptake and the most food-insecure households are substantially more 
likely to enrol. Recent illnesses, incidence of chronic diseases and self-assessed health status 
do not induce enrolment, while there is a positive link between past expenditure on 
outpatient care and enrolment. A relative novelty is the identification of the quality of health 
care on enrolment. We find that the availability of medical equipment and waiting time to 
see a medical professional play a substantial role in determining enrolment. Focus group 
discussions raise concerns about the behaviour of health care providers who tend to provide 
preferential treatment to uninsured households. Nevertheless, the start of the pilot scheme 
has been impressive and despite some concerns, almost all insured households indicate their 
intention to renew membership and more than half of uninsured households indicate a 
desire to enrol. While this augurs well, the estimates suggest that expanding uptake will 
require continued investments in the quality of health care.    
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1. Introduction  
Over the past decade, Ethiopia has recorded notable progress in a number of population 
health outcomes. For instance child mortality per 1000 live births has fallen from 166 in 
2000 to 88 in 2011 and maternal mortality rates have declined from 871 to 676 per 100,000 
live births. These changes have been accompanied by a rapid expansion of health-care 
infrastructure at all levels. According to Ethiopia’s Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH, 2011), 
there has been an 18-fold increase in the number of health posts from 833 in 2000 to 15,095 
in 2011 and a 7-fold increase (356 to 2,660) in the number of health centers over the same 
period. Consequently it is estimated that primary health care coverage, defined as village-
level access to a health post, has increased from 51 percent in 2000 to 92 percent in 2011.  
Despite these increases in the supply of health care and increases in the utilization of 
some specific services, overall utilization rates remain low. For example, according to the 
Ethiopian Demographic and Health Surveys, outpatient health care utilization per capita per 
year has increased only marginally from 0.27 visits in 2000 to 0.3 visits in 2011. The low 
utilization rates are accompanied by a high reliance on out-of-pocket (OOP) spending to 
finance health care. The FMoH (2010) estimates that the three main sources of health-care 
financing in Ethiopia are local and international donors (40 percent), out-of-pocket (OOP) 
spending by health-care users (37 percent), and central and local governments (21 percent). 
The remainder (about 2 percent) is covered by employer and other private insurance 
schemes.   
Since the late 1990s, as an alternative to informal risk-pooling approaches, 
community-based health insurance schemes (CBHI) which involve potential clients in 
determining scheme benefits and scheme management have been implemented in several 
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developing countries. Matching the roll-out of these schemes, theoretical and especially 
empirical studies which examine their impact on outcomes such as utilization of healthcare, 
financial protection, resource mobilization and social exclusion have proliferated. Early 
reviews of this body of work are provided by Jakab and Krishnan (2001) and Preker et al. 
(2002). Based on 45 published and unpublished works, Jakab and Krishnan (2001) conclude 
that there is convincing evidence that community health financing schemes are able to 
mobilize resources to finance healthcare needs, and that such schemes are effective in terms 
of reaching low-income groups although the lowest-income groups are often excluded.  As 
opposed to these two narrative reviews, Ekman (2004) provides a systematic review of the 
literature based on 36 studies conducted between 1980 and 2002.  Echoing previous 
findings, Ekman (2004) concludes that while such schemes do provide financial protection 
for low income groups, the magnitude of the effect is small and the lowest income groups 
are excluded from enrolment. More recently, based on a systematic review of 46 papers 
published between 1995 and 2012, among other aspects, Mebratie et al. (2013) examine the 
extent of social exclusion and adverse selection in CBHI schemes.  They conclude that a 
majority of papers (61 percent, 11 out of 18) find statistically significant evidence of 
exclusion of the lowest income groups from CBHI schemes. Even when such households 
become members, they tend to use healthcare services less intensively as compared to higher 
income groups potentially due to their inability to afford co-payments and other related costs 
(transportation and forgone income). They also report that about 67 percent (6 out of 9) of 
the studies find evidence that individuals suffering from chronic health conditions, a proxy 
for adverse selection, are more likely to join CBHI schemes as compared to those in good 
health.  
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In July 2011, with the aim of enhancing access to health care and reducing the 
burden of OOP expenditure, the Government of Ethiopia launched a pilot Community 
Based Health Insurance (CBHI) scheme. The scheme which caters to rural households and 
urban informal sector workers was rolled out in 13 districts located in four main regions 
(Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNPR) of the country.  The aim of this paper is to 
examine and identify factors that drive scheme enrolment. While straightforward this issue is 
pertinent from a policy perspective as the government plans a nation-wide roll-out of the 
scheme and hence it is important to examine what factors drive or deter enrolment.  
In addition to the policy relevance, the paper offers several innovative elements. 
First, unlike the bulk of the literature which relies on examining the effect of current traits 
(such as individual health conditions) on current enrolment and relies on a single post-
intervention cross-section of data, we are able to draw on two household surveys canvassed 
before and after the launch of the CBHI scheme to examine enrolment in 2012 as a function 
of individual, household and community traits in 2011.1 This enables us to provide estimates 
that are less likely to be influenced by the endogenous nature of some of the explanatory 
variables.  For instance, in the case of papers relying on post-intervention data, health status 
and enrolment in CBHI may be endogenous. Second, the paper draws on both survey data 
and qualitative information gathered through a series of key informant interviews (KII) and 
focus group discussions (FGD) to identify factors that drive or deter enrolment. A final 
novelty is that we are able to combine data from a health facility survey conducted prior to 
the launch of the CBHI scheme with the household survey data to examine the role played 
by the quality of health care in determining enrolment.  While some studies (Nketiah-
                                                 
1 Mebratie et al. (2013) report that of the fourteen papers which examine social exclusion in CBHI uptake using 
regression methods, only two studies are based on longitudinal data sets canvassed before and after the 
intervention. The remainder are cross-section studies based on post-intervention data. Similarly, only three out 
of nine that papers that have examined adverse selection rely on longitudinal data. 
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Amponsah, 2009; Chankova et al., 2008, Shimeles, 2010) do control for access to health care 
by including variables such as distance to the nearest health facility we are able to push 
further by directly examining the role of health care quality (for example, educational level of 
health professionals, availability of medical equipment).  
The article unfolds by providing in the next section a description of the key design 
features of the pilot scheme. Section three describes the data, section four discusses the 
research methods, section five contains empirical results and the final section concludes.  
2. Key features of the Ethiopian CBHI scheme  
In June 2011 the Ethiopian CBHI scheme was rolled out in 13 pilot districts in four main 
regions (Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNPR) of the country. 2  The pilot districts were 
selected by regional administrative bodies based on directives provided by the Federal 
Ministry of Health (FMoH).  While the chosen districts were expected to fulfill five selection 
criteria, in practice, selection was based on two conditions. Namely, the district should have 
undertaken health care financing reforms designed to increase cost recovery and retention of 
locally raised revenues and that health centres in these districts should be geographically 
accessible (located close to a main road).3  
The scheme was introduced by Ethiopia’s, Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH) in 
collaboration with USAID, Abt Associates Inc. an international consultancy company and 
CARE Ethiopia an international non-governmental organization. The scheme is part of the 
                                                 
2 The initial plan was to roll out the pilot scheme in 3 districts in each of the four regions. However, an 
additional district in Oromiya region volunteered to join the pilot scheme and was included. Together, these 
four main regions account for about 86 percent of the country’s population (Population Census Commission, 
2008). 
 
3 The complete set of selection criteria included (1) Willingness of district authorities to implement the schemes 
(2) Commitment of districts to support schemes, (3) Geographical accessibility of health centers (4) Quality of 
health centers, (5) The implementation of cost recovery, local revenue retention, and public pharmacy policies 
in health centers. 
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government’s broader health care financing reform strategy which aims to improve quality 
and coverage of health services by identifying alternative healthcare resources (USAID, 
2011). Feasibility studies, scheme design and scheme promotion were outsourced to Abt 
Associates and CARE Ethiopia. The basic design of the scheme in terms of benefit 
packages, registration fees and premium payments, co-payments were determined on the 
basis of feasibility studies and in collaboration with regional governments and are the same 
within each of the pilot regions but differ slightly across regions. Scheme implementation 
and monitoring is conducted by Abt Associates in collaboration with relevant government 
authorities at the central, regional, district, and village levels.   
While the scheme has been introduced by the government, it is ‘community based’ in 
the sense that the community determines whether or not to join the scheme and is 
subsequently involved in scheme management and supervision.4 In particular, after being 
exposed to a range of awareness creation activities a general assembly at the village (kebele) 
level decided whether or not to join the scheme (a simple majority had to support the 
decision) and then households decide individually whether to enrol in the scheme.5  In order 
to reduce the possibility of adverse selection the unit of membership is the household rather 
than the individual (FMoH, 2008).  
Based on feasibility studies conducted by Abt associates, regional health 
administration officials determined the premiums to be charged. Household level monthly 
premiums for core household members range between ETB 10.50 in SNNPR to ETB 15 in 
                                                 
4 In their review of the CBHI literature, Mebratie et al. (2013) classify the 48 schemes covered in the studies 
they review into three distinct scheme types. Sixteen are community prepayment health organizations, 7 are 
health care provider initiated insurance schemes, and 25 are classified as government run community involved 
health insurance schemes. The Ethiopian CBHI scheme falls in the last category  
 
5 According to information obtained from a key informant at Abt Associates, no village voted against the 
scheme and the programme rolled out in all villages in the pilot districts. 
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Oromiya (see Table 1).6  For each non-core household member the monthly premium lies 
between ETB 2.10 and ETB 3.00.  Premiums in Amhara region are set at ETB 3.00 per 
individual per month. The premiums amount to about 1-3 percent of household monthly 
income. 7  To enhance affordability the central government subsidizes a quarter of the 
premium and district and regional governments are expected to cover the costs of providing 
a fee waiver to the poorest 10 percent of the population or so called “indigent groups”.8  
Premium collection intervals differ across pilot districts and are sensitive to local 
conditions. While local level officials and community representatives are able to adjust the 
interval of premium collection they cannot change the premium. In order to enable 
community engagement every village is expected to select 3 delegates/CBHI members who 
will be part of the village CBHI administrative bodies and participate in the general assembly 
organized at district level. 9  According to information obtained from key informant 
interviews and focus group discussions, village level government officials and the community 
at large are involved in identifying the poorest households and implementing the fee waiver 
arrangement. 
                                                 
6 Core household members include a mother, father, and their children below age 18.  
 
7 This figure is based on an annual per capita income of USD 370 in 2011, an exchange rate of ETB 18 to USD 
1 and a household of 6 core members.  
 
8 Indigent groups are defined as those households who do not have land, a house, or any valuable assets. 
According to information obtained from Abt Associates, the coverage of the indigent groups depends on the 
budget allocated by district and regional governments. In December 2012, the share of indigent groups as a 
proportion of the total eligible households (300,605 households) ranged from a low of 0.9 percent in Deder 
district in Oromiya to 21.1 percent in South Achefer district in Amhara region. Nation-wide, by December 
2012, 8.9 percent of total eligible households had received a fee-waiver. 
 
9 The qualitative survey shows that the participation of the community in the decision making process of the 
scheme is limited. Only two CBHI members were actually selected as part of the village management and there 
were no regular meetings with the community to update members about the activities of the scheme and collect 
feedback.  
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The scheme covers both outpatient and inpatient health care services in public 
facilities. Transportation costs to access health facilities are not covered. Utilization of care 
from private providers is usually not permitted unless a particular service or drug is 
unavailable at a public facility. Treatment outside the country is not covered. Scheme 
participants are expected to access health providers who have signed a contractual agreement 
with district level CBHI administrators. The selection of the facilities takes into account a 
number of factors such as quality of the care (in terms of human resource and equipment), 
geographical proximity between the providers and the location of the target households, 
implementation of the healthcare financing reform, and service charges. There is no upfront 
payment at the time of service utilization if treatment is obtained from those facilities which 
have contractual agreements with the scheme. In Tigray, Amhara, and Oromiya regions, 
CBHI members are allowed to use care from public facilities that do not have formal 
contractual agreements with the scheme and then claim reimbursement. There is no 
reimbursement for service utilization outside CBHI linked facilities in SNNPR. 
Medical treatments which have largely cosmetic value (for example, artificial teeth 
and plastic surgery) are excluded.  There are no copayments as long as members follow the 
scheme’s referral procedure. When they seek care, scheme members are first expected to 
visit a health center and can subsequently access higher level care at district or regional 
hospitals as long as they have referral letters from the health center. Members who visit 
hospitals without referral letters need to cover 50 percent of their costs. Access to tertiary 
level care differs across regions. In Amhara and Tigray, CBHI enrolees may visit any public 
hospital within the region but not outside the region. In SNNPR, care is covered only in the 
nearest public hospital while in Oromiya coverage includes hospitals located outside the 
region. 
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According to our survey data, scheme uptake was 41 percent in April 2012 (see Table 
1) and according to Abt Associates uptake reached 45.5 percent in December 2012 (see 
Table 2). As compared to the experience of several other African countries the speed of 
uptake is remarkable. For instance, uptake in Mali was 11.4 percent after six years (Diop et 
al., 2006), 4.8 percent after two years in Senegal (Smith and Sulzbach, 2008), 2.8 percent in 
Tanzania after six years (Chee et al., 2002), 35 percent in Rwanda after seven years and 85 
percent after nine years (Shimeles, 2010).  
3. Data  
This paper draws on three different types of data – two rounds of a longitudinal household 
survey, a health facility survey, and qualitative information from key informant interviews 
and focus group discussions.  
Prior to the launch of the CBHI scheme in July 2011, a baseline household survey 
was conducted between March and April 2011 and a follow up survey was undertaken 
between March and April 2012. The household surveys cover 12 of the 13 CBHI pilot 
districts and 4 non-intervention districts located in four regions (Tigray, Amhara, Oromoya, and 
SNNPR).10 From each of the 16 sampled districts, 6 villages (Kebeles) were randomly chosen 
and within each village 17 households were randomly chosen to yield a total of 1,632 
households. This paper is based on the surveys conducted in the CBHI pilot districts which 
include a total of 1,224 households in 2011, of which 1,203 were interviewed again in 2012.11  
In addition to an extensive module on household and individual health conditions, 
the surveys contain information on a variety of individual and household socio-economic 
                                                 
10 In each of the four regions there are three CBHI districts and one control district. 
 
11 In total, the second round of the survey covered 1,599 (2% attrition) households that had been canvassed in 
the first round. 
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attributes (consumption expenditure, assets, household demographics, employment), access 
to formal and informal sources of credit, and involvement in social networks. The health 
module includes questions regarding self-rated health status and outpatient and inpatient 
health care utilization for each household member. The recall period for outpatient health 
care is two months preceding the survey while it is 12 months in the case of inpatient health 
care.  Medical health expenditure including transport costs, consultation and diagnosis costs, 
drug costs and other health care related expenses for each episode of health care 
consumption are recorded. The second round of the survey enquired whether households 
had enrolled in the CBHI, and their reasons for doing so.  
While the household surveys contain information on access to health facilities (travel 
time to reach the nearest health facilities), in order to assess and potentially control for the 
quality of health care services in determining enrolment, we combine the surveys with 
information gathered from 48 health care centers (3 randomly selected health centers from 
each of the 16 districts). We focused on health centers as these are usually the main source 
of curative health care in rural Ethiopia. The health facility survey was canvassed between 
April and May 2011, that is, before the introduction of the CBHI scheme. The health facility 
survey contains information on the educational qualifications and work experience of the 
head of the facility, availability of medical equipment, and the head’s (self-) assessment of the 
quality of care provided by the facility. In addition, the survey obtained information from 
five randomly chosen patients who were exiting from the health center, on the time taken to 
obtain a patient registration card and time taken between obtaining the registration card and 
consulting with a health care professional. Based on information provided by the district 
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health offices, households from the 96 sampled villages were matched to the 48 health 
centres on the basis of household proximity to the health centers.12 
In order to understand the overall vision of the scheme and to gain a clearer 
understanding of design, operation and implementation issues at different levels of 
government, between December 2012 and January 2013, 15 key informant interviews were 
conducted. These interviews include FMoH, Abt Associates, Care Ethiopia, four regional 
level CBHI coordinators, four district level CBHI officials and four village level CBHI 
managers from each of the pilot region. Eight focus group discussions, two in each of four 
villages randomly selected per region, were conducted with groups of 7 to 12 individuals. 
Each FGD had at least three and at most six female participants. One of the FGDs was 
conducted with scheme members and focused on their motivation for joining the scheme 
and their views on scheme operation while the other was conducted with non-members and 
focused on why they had chosen not to join the scheme.  
4. Estimating the determinants of CBHI enrolment 
We treat the probability that a household enrols in the CBHI scheme as a function of a range 
of factors that are likely to influence both the demand for health insurance and for health 
care. In particular, we focus on the role of three main sets of variables, that is, household 
socio-economic status, health status and past use of health care services, and access to and 
quality of health care, in determining enrolment.  The enrolment status of household h in 
time period t (2012) is expressed as a function of various sets of variables in period t-1 (2011) 
and written as, 
   hthththththththt SSQSSAFISCHSDESESFCBHI    1111111P         (1) 
                                                 
12 On average about 41 households were matched to one health center.  
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where,CBHI  is a binary variable with a value of 1 if a household is enrolled in the scheme 
and zero, otherwise. Socio-economic status (SES) is a set of variables that includes the 
educational status of the head of the household, whether a household participates in a social 
security programme called the productive safety net programme (PSNP) which targets 
chronically food insecure households and the consumption quintile in which a household 
falls.13 14 DE is a set of variables that captures the demographic profile of households and 
includes the gender of the household head, household size, proportion of male and female 
household members in different age groups and religion of the household head. To account 
for the role of a household’s health status, past illnesses, health care use and health care 
expenditure in determining enrolment status we include a set of variables (HS) indicating 
past illness events, incidence of chronic disease, use of outpatient and inpatient care, 
outpatient and impatient health care expenditure, and household self-reported health status 
(good, fair, poor). FISC includes variables that control for access to formal and informal 
sources of credit and the strength of a household’s social network. These include variables 
such as whether a household has savings in a bank account, outstanding loans, is a member 
of a credit and savings association, and member of an Iqqub.15 The strength of a household’s 
social network is proxied, amongst other variables, by membership in a Wonfel or a Debo, 
                                                 
13  The productive safety net programme (PSNP) is a government social security programme designed to 
support chronically food insecure households. Participants engage in public works (road and school 
construction, soil and water conservation) and receive payments in cash or food.  
 
14 Since we are interested in identifying the separate effect of health care expenditure the consumption measure 
used here is net of health care expenditure.  
 
15 Iqqub is a rotating credit and savings association.  
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membership in church/mosque based religious groups, and whether any household member 
has ever held or holds an official government position.16  
We include two sets of supply side characteristics. One set, access to health care 
facilities (SSA) includes travel time to health centers and hospitals while a second set (SSQ) 
includes a range of variables to capture the quality of health care on offer. This includes 
information on the education and training of the head of the facility, availability of medical 
equipment, waiting time to obtain a patient card and to see a medical care provider and the 
perception of the quality of care provided by the facility as reported by its head. 17  In 
addition, we also include a set of regional controls and control for community level access to 
infrastructure (roads, access to water and electricity).  
A description of the variables and summary statistics are provided in Table A1 and 
Table 3, respectively.   
5. Results 
We estimate equation (1) using a logit model.  To explore the sensitivity of the estimates to 
different ways of measuring health status we present four different sets of estimates. 
Marginal effect estimates, with standard errors clustered at the level of the primary sampling 
unit (the village), are provided in Table 4.  Table 5 contains information on the main reasons 
for purchasing insurance.  
Unlike the bulk of the existing papers on enrolment in CBHI which find that the 
lowest-income groups are often excluded from the scheme, uptake of the Ethiopian CBHI 
                                                 
16 Wonfel & Debo are traditional associations involving informal labour sharing arrangements in agricultural 
activities.  
 
17 ‘Perceived quality of health care services’ is based on eliciting the view of the head of the health facility 
survey on the overall quality of health care services provided by the facility. The specific question was, in 
general, do you think that this health center is providing the expected standard of health care services, yes or 
no. 
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program reveals the opposite, with the poorest quintile providing the largest share of CBHI 
beneficiaries (Table 3). The logit estimates suggest that this inclusion of the poorest is partly 
driven by participation in the productive safety net programme (PSNP), which targets 
chronically food insecure households and is associated with a 33 to 34 percentage point 
increase in CBHI enrolment.18 Conditional on PSNP participation, the educational status of 
the household head and the consumption quintile in which a household falls have no 
statistically significant bearing on enrolment. The relative pro-poor character of the CBHI 
uptake may in part also be attributed to the targeted subsidy provided to indigent 
households. As shown in Table 2, about 20 percent (8.9/45.5) of enrolled households in 
December 2012 were receiving a fee waiver. 
The qualitative information gathered through the key informant interviews and via 
observations in the field suggests two reasons for the remarkably large effect of PSNP 
participation. First, government officials have been taking measures to integrate different 
development interventions such as agricultural extension, education and health programmes. 
Households covered by the PSNP are provided information on the health insurance scheme 
and encouraged to enrol. This is illustrated by a statement made by a key informant in Tigray 
region, 
“Continuous education on health issues including about the recently introduced 
community based health insurance scheme is provided to those people who are 
covered under PSNP. Moreover, during the distribution of PSNP payments, the 
participants are asked if they would like to register for CBHI and those who 
volunteer pay immediately and join” [Interviewed on December 07, 2012].  
 
Second, while the pro-poor tilt of the scheme is a positive aspect it is possible that the 
enrolment of PSNP beneficiaries may not be entirely voluntary. Village level CBHI officials 
may exert pressure and force households to enrol. Our data show that about 10 percent (50 
                                                 
18 A majority (55 percent) of the PSNP beneficiaries fall in the bottom two quintiles of the consumption 
distribution.  
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out of 489) of insured households indicate that their main reason for joining the scheme is 
pressure from CBHI officials (Table 5).  In relation to this, an uninsured FGD participant in 
Oromiya region said,   
“A kebele (village) official reduced my monthly income from PSNP and informed me 
that the reduced money was for CBHI membership contribution. I said I did not 
want to enrol in the scheme and asked him to give me my full PSNP benefit. 
However, he did not pay me. So, I accused him to a higher kebele official and I got 
my money back” [Discussed on December 23, 2013].   
 
The gender and age distribution of household members may affect CBHI uptake. 
For instance, households with more children, a greater proportion of elderly household 
members or adult females in the reproductive age group may be more likely to demand 
health insurance and health care. Some evidence of this is available in Table 5. However, 
apart from household size, which is associated with a 2 percentage point increase in the 
probability of enrolment there is no statistically significant relationship between household 
composition and scheme enrolment. In three of the four regions (Tigray, Oromiya and 
SNNPR) the insurance contribution is fixed per household and hence the scheme may be 
especially attractive for households with a large family size. Orthodox Christians are about 
14 percentage points more likely to join the scheme as compared to other religions. The 
reasons for this are not entirely clear.  
There is no evidence that poor self-assessed health status has a bearing on 
enrolment. Similarly, illnesses, incidence of chronic diseases, duration of hospitalization and 
utilization of care (outpatient and inpatient) are not positively linked to CBHI uptake. In 
fact, there is a negative link between enrolment and chronic disease. While pre-existing 
medical conditions and utilization may not induce uptake it does seem that recent episodes 
of health care spending on outpatient care prompt enrolment – a half a standard deviation 
increase, about 100 Birr, in outpatient expenditure is associated with a 2.5 percentage point 
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increase in enrolment. Nevertheless, only about 8 percent of insured households reported 
that they joined the scheme because of frequent illnesses in their households (see Table 5).  
The existing papers, of which six out of nine find evidence of adverse selection, tend to use 
the incidence of illness as their selection measure. If we were to use a similar measure then 
we would conclude that adverse selection is unlikely to be major concern in the current 
scheme. While it is hard to make a definitive claim, perhaps a key reason for the lack of 
selection effects is that, in order to discourage enrolment on the basis of pre-existing medical 
conditions, enrolment is permitted only at the household and not at the individual level.19  
Access to formal and informal sources of credit and membership in social networks 
may have a positive or a negative effect on demand for health insurance. On the one hand, 
belonging to a network may reduce the incentive to participate in the CBHI scheme while at 
the same time such networks may be sources of finance to purchase insurance and may also 
help enhance understanding of health insurance. The key informant interviews and the focus 
group discussions revealed that various social networks such as Iddir (funeral association), 
Iqqub and religious groups were used to raise understanding of CBHI and to persuade 
households to join the scheme. However, except for the variable which indicates that a 
household member holds or held an official government position, none of the credit or 
network related variables have a bearing on enrolment. Holding or ever having held an 
administrative or community leadership position enhances CBHI enrolment by about 11-12 
percentage points. This is perhaps not surprising. The qualitative data collection efforts show 
that in all regions, kebele officials and community leaders were provided information and 
understanding of the scheme and were expected to inform their constituencies and help 
generate interest in the scheme.  
                                                 
19 All six of the papers/schemes which find evidence of adverse selection permit enrolment at an individual 
level. 
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Turning to supply side factors, contrary to expectations, there is a positive 
association between travel time to health centers and CBHI membership. A one standard 
deviation increase (about 45 minutes) in travel time increases enrolment by 3.6 percentage 
points. Travel time to public hospitals does not have a bearing on CBHI uptake.  While 
unexpected the positive link between distance and enrolment may be driven by the higher 
costs (transportation and health care related) of accessing health care for households living in 
areas far from the health centres which may provide a stronger incentive to enrol. There is a 
clear and discernible link between the quality of care on offer and CBHI uptake. For 
instance, availability of blood testing equipment in the closest health facility increases the 
probability of CBHI enrolment by 31 percentage points. Average waiting time to see a health 
care professional, a measure of quality in its own right and a proxy for facility staffing levels, 
exerts a negative effect on enrolment. A one standard deviation reduction in waiting time (28 
minutes) is associated with a 12 percentage point increase in enrolment.  
The importance of the quality of care in determining insurance uptake and use of 
services also emerged from the focus group discussions. Both insured and uninsured FGD 
participants from all regions criticized the quality of available services and indicated that  
even if public health facilities were relatively accessible in terms of distance as compared to 
private facilities, a number of them did not have the necessary laboratory equipment and 
medicines. In relation to this, an insured FGD participant in Amhara region shared her 
experience, 
“I went to private providers and incurred OOP health care expenditure even if I am a 
CBHI member. The health center in our village did not have laboratory equipment and 
the health workers could not examine my real health problem.” [Discussed on January 
11, 2013].  
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An additional issue which we cannot control for in our estimates but was revealed by 
the qualitative information is the reported behavior and attitude of medical providers to 
those who have insurance.  For instance, an insured FGD participant in SNNPR explained, 
“The health professionals do not provide equal services and respect for both insured and 
uninsured patients. They give medicine only for non-members of the scheme and they 
tell members of the scheme to buy from private stores and we are forced to buy drugs 
from our pockets even if we have health insurance cards” [Discussed on January 24, 
2013]. 
 
Similarly, uninsured FGD participants in Oromiya region believed, 
“The doctors give priority to those patients who pay in cash during services provision 
and insured people do not get quick services. Moreover, they do not want to properly 
treat insured patients and think that most insured people come to health facility just for 
check up for minor medical cases since CBHI members do not pay cash during services 
utilization” [Discussed on December 25, 2013]. 
  
Based on the FGD the two reasons for the preferential treatment meted out to uninsured 
patients is their immediate contribution to the revenues of the health facilities and their 
apparent overuse of health care facilities. Doctors/facilities may also prefer to treat the 
unisured due to the paper work required to receive payments for insured patients and the 
payment lag.20  
Households in Amhara and Oromiya regions are about 20 to 25 percentage points 
more likely to enrol as compared to households living in Tigray and SNNPR. A possible 
reason behind the lower CBHI participation in SNNPR region, at least initially, could be the 
relative difference in the design characteristics of the schemes. Unlike the three pilot sites, 
CBHI members in SNNPR have limited access to tertiary health care services. Insured 
households in this region may only use tertiary services at the nearest public hospital (while 
                                                 
20 Health facilities are expected to submit claims on a quarterly basis. To be reimbursed, health facilities need to 
submit a claim based on a specific format and submit it to the district CBHI offices. Photocopies of the 
signatures of CBHI members who used health care services also need to be attached. The district CBHI offices 
are supposed to pay 75 percent of the claims within three days of receipt of the forms by checks/bank transfer 
without any investigation. Prior to paying out the remainder, a medical audit is expected to be conducted. Once 
approved, the rest of the claims are paid out.   
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those in Amhara may visit any public hospital within the region and those in Oromiya may 
use care from public hospitals within and outside the region). Similarly, unlike the other 
three regions, insured households in SNNPR cannot claim reimbursements if they use health 
care services from private providers in the event that medical equipment or drugs are not 
available in CBHI linked facilities. In addition, SNNPR is a relatively poorer province (see 
Table A2, consumption quintiles) and the lower uptake may also reflect a lower capacity to 
pay for health insurance. Despite low uptake in April 2012 potentially due to the reasons 
discussed above, by December 2012 enrolment in the region had caught up with the leading 
region in the country. In the case of Tigray, while the features of the insurance package do 
not differ as compared to other regions it lacks behind in terms of the quality of care and 
records the longest waiting times across regions and is also not particularly well-resourced in 
terms of equipment (see Table A2).   
6. Conclusion 
This paper used data from longitudinal household surveys, a health facility survey 
and qualitative information obtained through focus group discussions and key informant 
interviews to analyse the factors that determine insurance uptake in a pilot CBHI scheme 
introduced by the Ethiopian government in June 2011. The paper focused on three issues – 
whether the scheme is socially inclusive, whether uptake is more likely amongst households 
with specific health care status and health needs and the role of the quality of health care in 
influencing uptake.  
We found that by December 2012, a year and a half since being introduced, scheme 
uptake had reached an impressive 45.5 percent of target households. This is remarkable as 
compared to the experiences of other Sub-Saharan African countries which have introduced 
similar schemes. With regard to social inclusion, unlike the bulk of the literature which finds 
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that the lowest income groups are often excluded from such schemes we found that the 
CBHI scheme may be characterised as pro-poor. However, there was no evidence that 
socioeconomic status as measured by consumption quintiles and education of the household 
head directly influences enrolment. Rather, we found that food insecure households who 
have participated or still participate in the productive safety net programme (PSNP) are far 
more likely (33 percentage points) to join the pilot scheme. The inclusive nature of the 
scheme may be attributed to the government’s targeted subsidy program while the PSNP 
effect may be attributed to two reasons. On a positive note the KII and the FGD revealed 
that the government is making efforts to integrate various development interventions and 
recipients of one government program are far more likely to be informed about other 
government programs which in turn encourages uptake. On a relatively negative note we 
also found evidence of officials coercing PSNP beneficiaries to join the scheme. About 10 
percent of insured households indicated that they had been pressurized into joining the 
scheme.  Self-assessed health status and past illnesses and symptoms are not positively 
correlated with uptake and about 8 percent of insured households indicated that the main 
reason for enrolling in the scheme is that household members are frequently ill. Given these 
figures it is unlikely that adverse selection will seriously afflict the scheme. An explanation 
for this may be the scheme design which was explicitly designed to mitigate adverse selection 
by permitting enrolment only at the household level.  
A relatively novel contribution of the paper is our examination of the role of the 
quality of care on uptake. The availability of medical equipment and waiting time to see a 
medical professional, played a large role in determining enrolment.  For instance, the 
availability of blood testing equipment at the nearest health center was associated with a 30 
percentage point increase in enrolment while a one standard deviation reduction in waiting 
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time was associated with a 12 percentage point increase in uptake. During the FGD both 
insured and non-insured groups criticised the shortage of medical equipment, lack of drugs 
and also pointed out that health providers favoured uninsured patients versus the insured. 
The proximate reasons for this appear to be the immediate payments provided by the 
uninsured and the administrative burden associated with obtaining payments for providing 
services to the insured.  
The start of the pilot scheme has been impressive and despite coercion in some cases 
and criticisms about the quality of care, a clear signal of the benefits emanating from the 
scheme is that almost all insured households (96 percent) indicate that they will renew their 
membership (see Table 5). At the same time about 57 percent of uninsured households state 
that they plan to enrol in the future. While this augurs well as the government plans to 
spread the scheme to an additional 161 districts which fulfil the same selection criteria as the 
12 pilot districts, the results presented here suggest that expanding uptake will need 
continued investments in the quality of care and attempts to alter the differential treatment 
received by the insured.    
 21 
References 
Chankova, S., S. Sulzbach and F. Diop (2008) 'Impact of Mutual Health Organizations: 
Evidence from West Africa', Health Policy and Planning 23(4): 264-276.  
Chee G, K. Smith and A. Kapinga (2002) 'Assessment of Community Health Fund in 
Hanang District, Tanzania'. The Partners for Health Reformplus Project, Abt 
Associates Inc., Bethesda, MD. 
Chen, G. and X. Yan (2012) 'Demand for Voluntary Basic Medical Insurance in Urban 
China: Panel Evidence from the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance Scheme', 
Health Policy and Planning 27(8): 658-668 
Diop, F., S. Sulzbach and S. Chankova (2006), 'The impact of mutual health organizations 
on social inclusion, access to health care, and household income protection: Evidence 
from Ghana, Senegal, and Mali', PHRplus, Abt Associates Inc, Bethesda. 
Ekman, B. (2004) 'Community-Based Health Insurance in Low-Income Countries: A 
Systematic Review of the Evidence', Health Policy and Planning 19(5): 249-270. 
FMoH (2008) 'Health Insurance Strategy'. Addis Ababa: Federal Ministry of Health Planning 
and Program Department. 
FMoH (2010) Health Sector Development Programme IV: 2010/11 – 2014/15, Addis 
Ababa: The Ethiopian Federal Ministry of Health. 
FMoH (2011) Health and Health Related Indicators for 2003 EC (2011 GC). Addis Ababa: 
Planning and Programming Departement, Ethiopia Federal Ministry of Health. 
Jakab, M. and C. Krishnan (2001) 'Community Involvement in Health Care Financing: 
Impact, Strengths and weaknesses–A Synthesis of Literature', Discussion paper for 
WHO Commission on Macroeconomic and Health. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Lammers, J.; Warmerdam, S. (2010) ‘Adverse Selection in Voluntary Micro Health Insurance 
in Nigeria,’ AIID Research Series 10-06. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for 
International Development.  
Mebratie, A. D., R. Sparrow, G. Alemu, and A.S. Bedi, (2013) ‘Community-Based Health 
Insurance Schemes: A Systematic Review’, Proceedings of the 4th Amhara Regional 
Conference, edited by Nahu Asteraye & Demirew Getachew, pp. 279-317, Addis 
Ababa: Ethiopian Economics Association 
Nketiah-Amponsah E. (2009) 'Demand for health insurance among women in Ghana: cross-
 22 
sectional evidence', International Research Journal of Finance and Economics (33):179–191. 
Population Census Commission (2008) Summary and statistical Report of the 2007: 
Population Size by Age and Sex, Population and Housing Census, Addis Ababa. 
Preker, A.S., G. Carrin, D.M. Dror, M. Jakab, W. Hsiao and D. Arhin-Tenkorang (2002) 
‘Effectiveness of Community Health Financing in Meeting the Cost of Illness’, Bulletin 
of the World Health Organization 80(2): 143-150. 
Shimeles, A. (2010) 'Community Based Health Insurance Schemes in Africa: The Case of 
Rwanda', GU Working Papers in Economics 463. Göteborg: Göteborg University.  
Smith, K.V. and S. Sulzbach (2008) 'Community-Based Health Insurance and Access to 
Maternal Health Services: Evidence from Three West African Countries', Social Science 
and Medicine 66(12): 2460-2473.  
USAID (2011) 'Ethiopia Health Sector Financing Reform', the United States Agency for 
International Development, the Global Health Technical Assistance Project, Addis 
Ababa. 
Wang, H., W. Yip, L. Zhang, L. Wang and W. Hsiao (2005) 'Community-Based Health 
Insurance in Poor Rural China: The Distribution of Net Benefits', Health Policy and 
Planning 20(6): 366-374. 
Zhang, L. and H. Wang (2008) 'Dynamic Process of Adverse Selection: Evidence from a 
Subsidized Community-Based Health Insurance in Rural China', Social Science and 
Medicine 67(7): 1173-1182. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23 
Table 1 
CBHI in Ethiopia – Premiums, payment intervals and enrolment  
Region Unit of 
contribution 
Premium per month Payment interval CBHI 
uptake in 
April 2012 
(%) 
Core 
household 
members 
Per 
extended 
family 
member 
Tigray Household  ETB 11.00  ETB 2.50 Annual  34 
Amhara Individual ETB   3.00  ETB 3.00 Biannual  49 
Oromiya Household ETB 15.00 ETB 3.00 Gimbichu district -  annual 
Kuyu, Deder, and L. Kossa districts 
– annual or biannual 
44 
SNNPR Household ETB 10.50  ETB 2.10 Yirgalem and D. Woyde – quarterly 
Damboya  - three times a year 
35 
Total     41 
Notes: In addition to the premiums there is a one-time registration fee of ETB 5.00 per household.  
Source: Abt Associates and key informant interviews at the federal, district and regional levels. CBHI 
uptake rates are the authors’ calculations based on the 2012 round of the household survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
CBHI uptake and fee waiver beneficiaries up to December 31, 2012 
Region No of 
Eligible 
HHs 
Registered HHs 
Paying Non-paying Total 
% N % N % N 
Tigray 75,190 33.4 25,101 11.5 8,651 44.9 33,752 
Amhara 86,628 42.0 36,412 16.0 13,865 58.0 50,277 
Oromiya 106,674 29.3 31,301 2.6 2,750 31.9 34,051 
SNNPR 32,113 53.6 17,228 4.2 1,342 57.8 18,570 
        
      Total  300,605 36.6 110,042 8.9 26,608 45.5 136,650 
Source: Abt Associates, Addis Ababa 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics by insurance status, 2011 
Variable Enrolled Non-Enrolled Mean 
differences 
p-value 
Total 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Socioeconomic status        
Poorest consumption quintile 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.39 0.0462 0.20 0.40 
2nd consumption quintile 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.9255 0.20 0.40 
3rd consumption quintile 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41 0.3832 0.20 0.40 
4th consumption quintile 0.18 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.1301 0.20 0.40 
Richest consumption quintile 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.7655 0.20 0.40 
HH head education- No education at all 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.0387 0.46 0.50 
HH head education- Informal  0.16 0.37 0.11 0.32 0.0214 0.13 0.34 
HH head education- Primary or above  0.42 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.6313 0.41 0.49 
Participates in PSNP 0.28 0.45 0.17 0.38 0.0000 0.21 0.41 
Demographic traits        
Male headed HH  0.90 0.31 0.84 0.36 0.0108 0.87 0.34 
Age of HH head 46.91 12.68 46.79 14.75 0.8860 46.84 13.96 
Household size 6.25 2.21 5.61 2.26 0.0000 5.87 2.26 
Prop. of children aged under 6 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.0669 0.14 0.15 
Prop. of male aged 6 to 15 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.0766 0.16 0.15 
Prop. of female aged 6 to 15 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.0108 0.15 0.15 
Prop. of male aged 16 to 64 0.26 0.15 0.25 0.17 0.4008 0.25 0.16 
Prop. of female aged 16 to 64 0.25 0.14 0.26 0.16 0.7691 0.25 0.15 
Prop. of elderly aged above 64 0.03 0.11 0.06 0.18 0.0029 0.05 0.15 
HH head religion - Orthodox Christian 0.62 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.3421 0.61 0.49 
HH head religion – Protestant 0.18 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.1920 0.20 0.40 
HH head religion – Muslim 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.4022 0.18 0.38 
HH head religion - Other religion or no religion 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.16 0.0535 0.02 0.14 
Health status and health care use        
Prop. of household members with good SAH 0.81 0.32 0.74 0.38 0.0015 0.77 0.35 
Prop. of household members with fair SAH 0.15 0.29 0.21 0.35 0.0016 0.18 0.33 
Prop. of household members with low SAH 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.16 0.4860 0.05 0.15 
Past illness event 8.75 16.06 9.13 16.61 0.6881 8.98 16.39 
Chronic illness 0.24 0.65 0.35 0.31 0.0216 0.31 0.82 
Outpatient care use 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.48 0.6288 0.38 0.49 
Inpatient care use 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 0.6913 0.03 0.17 
Duration of hospitalization  0.37 2.61 0.59 8.04 0.5678 0.50 6.44 
Outpatient healthcare expenditure 80.21 307.81 42.33 129.87 0.0031 57.47 219.71 
Inpatient healthcare expenditure 44.40 415.49 40.81 451.0 0.8883 8.98 16.39 
Trust in modern care – Disagree 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.8683 0.06 0.23 
Trust in modern care - Neither agree nor disagree 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.23 0.2621 0.05 0.22 
Trust in modern care – Agree 0.90 0.30 0.89 0.32 0.3564 0.89 0.31 
Formal and informal access to credit and networks        
Member of Iqqub 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24 0.1140 0.07 0.25 
Member of credit & saving association 0.17 0.38 0.09 0.29 0.0000 0.12 0.33 
Member of religious group 0.59 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.8083 0.59 0.49 
Participate in Wonfel or Debo 0.46 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.3777 0.44 0.50 
Savings in bank account 0.16 0.37 0.12 0.33 0.0311 0.14 0.35 
Outstanding loan 0.38 0.49 0.28 0.45 0.0006 0.32 0.47 
Some one to rely on  0.40 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.2846 0.38 0.49 
Official position held 0.29 0.46 0.19 0.39 0.0000 0.23 0.42 
Supply side characteristics        
Travel time to health center  70.00 46.94 64.07 43.37 0.0235 66.44 44.90 
Travel time to public hospital  113.58 65.83 114.44 75.51 0.8373 114.10 71.77 
Completed first degree (12+3) 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.6293 0.46 0.50 
Received on the job training 0.81 0.39 0.83 0.38 0.4754 0.82 0.38 
Availability of blood testing equipment 0.92 0.26 0.77 0.42 0.0000 0.83 0.37 
Availability of urine testing equipment 0.94 0.24 0.88 0.33 0.0005 0.90 0.30 
Waiting time to get patient card  10.56 10.06 14.60 12.59 0.0000 12.99 11.81 
Waiting time to see a medical professional  28.33 23.97 38.48 29.42 0.0000 34.43 27.81 
Perceived quality of care 0.65 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.0000 0.50 0.50 
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Variable Enrolled Non-Enrolled Mean 
differences 
p-value 
Total 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Community characteristics        
Region – Tigray 0.21 0.41 0.28 0.45 0.0042 0.25 0.43 
Region – Amhara 0.30 0.46 0.21 0.41 0.0005 0.25 0.43 
Region – Oromiya 0.27 0.45 0.24 0.42 0.1476 0.25 0.43 
Region – SNNPR 0.22 0.41 0.27 0.44 0.0399 0.25 0.43 
Travel time to all weather road  38.45 35.75 36.46 39.42 0.3718 37.25 37.99 
Travel time to asphalt road  80.31 53.09 78.58 63.20 0.6193 79.27 59.35 
Access to improved water 0.78 0.41 0.73 0.44 0.0369 0.75 0.43 
Access to modern light 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.6892 0.04 0.21 
Radio use 0.74 0.44 0.70 0.46 0.0696 0.72 0.45 
Mobile phone use 0.42 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.3391 0.40 0.49 
     
Observations 489 735  1224 
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Table 4 
Probability of enrolment - marginal effects (std. error) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socioeconomic status     
2nd consumption quintile (ref: poorest consumption quintile) 0.0185 0.0232 0.0208 0.0230 
 (0.0518) (0.0527) (0.0519) (0.0528) 
3rd consumption quintile 0.0240 0.0332 0.0291 0.0324 
 (0.0508) (0.0522) (0.0517) (0.0525) 
4th consumption quintile 0.0424 0.0420 0.0408 0.0397 
 (0.0535) (0.0533) (0.0531) (0.0537) 
Richest consumption quintile 0.0748 0.0792 0.0774 0.0793 
 (0.0681) (0.0701) (0.0692) (0.0696) 
HH head education- Informal (ref: no education at all) 0.0168 0.0136 0.0141 0.00984 
 (0.0521) (0.0516) (0.0515) (0.0515) 
HH head education- Primary or above  0.0390 0.0412 0.0418 0.0365 
 (0.0472) (0.0474) (0.0473) (0.0475) 
Participated in PSNP 0.328*** 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.337*** 
 (0.0649) (0.0654) (0.0654) (0.0647) 
Demographic traits     
Male headed HH  0.0264 0.0311 0.0306 0.0316 
 (0.0525) (0.0500) (0.0508) (0.0501) 
Age of HH head 0.000548 0.000430 0.000318 0.000538 
 (0.00184) (0.00184) (0.00183) (0.00186) 
Household size 0.0223** 0.0214** 0.0217** 0.0199* 
 (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0108) 
Prop. of children aged under 6 (ref: Prop. of male aged 16 to 64) -0.0940 -0.104 -0.102 -0.0694 
 (0.177) (0.176) (0.176) (0.178) 
Prop. of male aged 6 to 15 -0.0192 -0.0168 -0.0158 0.00198 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.170) 
Prop. of female aged 6 to 15 0.128 0.125 0.124 0.141 
 (0.173) (0.170) (0.172) (0.171) 
Prop. of female aged 16 to 64 0.0511 0.0541 0.0590 0.0734 
 (0.204) (0.206) (0.205) (0.205) 
Prop. of elderly aged above 64 -0.200 -0.173 -0.172 -0.163 
 (0.177) (0.170) (0.171) (0.176) 
HH head religion - Orthodox Christian (ref: Muslim) 0.144* 0.136* 0.136* 0.143* 
 (0.0757) (0.0761) (0.0769) (0.0768) 
HH head religion – Protestant 0.106 0.0976 0.0935 0.100 
 (0.104) (0.105) (0.105) (0.106) 
HH head religion - Other religion or no religion -0.0686 -0.0781 -0.0825 -0.0577 
 (0.135) (0.131) (0.132) (0.136) 
Health status and health care use     
Prop. of household members with fair SAH (ref: Prop. of household 
members with high SAH) 
-0.0872 -0.0959 -0.0940 -0.106* 
 (0.0602) (0.0596) (0.0601) (0.0591) 
Prop. of household members with low SAH 0.210 0.123 0.112 0.0927 
 (0.138) (0.136) (0.130) (0.131) 
Past illness event 0.00143  0.000816  
 (0.00109)  (0.00103)  
Chronic illness -0.0513**    
 (0.0222)    
Outpatient care use  0.0239   
  (0.0330)   
Inpatient care use  -0.0773 -0.0875  
  (0.0850) (0.0818)  
Duration of hospitalization -0.00166    
 (0.00458)    
Outpatient healthcare expenditure    0.000246** 
    (9.59e-05) 
Inpatient healthcare expenditure    -2.26e-05 
    (2.36e-05) 
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VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Trust in modern care - Neither agree nor disagree (ref: Disagree) -0.0267 -0.0337 -0.0304 -0.0261 
 (0.0836) (0.0822) (0.0832) (0.0821) 
Trust in modern care - Agree 0.0867 0.0820 0.0827 0.0837 
 (0.0717) (0.0729) (0.0735) (0.0728) 
Formal and informal access to credit and social networks     
Member of Iqqub 0.0532 0.0614 0.0620 0.0689 
 (0.0777) (0.0764) (0.0767) (0.0760) 
Member of credit & savings association -0.00685 -0.0108 -0.0112 -0.00981 
 (0.0690) (0.0688) (0.0686) (0.0703) 
Member of religious group 0.0277 0.0315 0.0336 0.0305 
 (0.0404) (0.0394) (0.0392) (0.0395) 
Participate in Wonfel or Debo 0.0339 0.0335 0.0352 0.0370 
 (0.0428) (0.0427) (0.0423) (0.0434) 
Savings in bank account 0.0503 0.0443 0.0464 0.0414 
 (0.0621) (0.0620) (0.0624) (0.0630) 
Outstanding loan 0.0761 0.0794 0.0805 0.0811 
 (0.0497) (0.0492) (0.0493) (0.0498) 
Someone to rely on  -0.0291 -0.0345 -0.0334 -0.0343 
 (0.0287) (0.0285) (0.0286) (0.0285) 
Official position held 0.119*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0432) (0.0435) (0.0433) (0.0421) 
Supply side characteristics     
Travel time to health center  0.000807* 0.000857** 0.000847** 0.000834* 
 (0.000418) (0.000421) (0.000422) (0.000428) 
Travel time to public hospital  0.000167 0.000164 0.000165 0.000207 
 (0.000421) (0.000426) (0.000423) (0.000423) 
Completed first degree (12+3) -0.105 -0.105 -0.104 -0.110 
 (0.0749) (0.0743) (0.0752) (0.0749) 
Received on the job training -0.0374 -0.0485 -0.0474 -0.0470 
 (0.0925) (0.0948) (0.0944) (0.0949) 
Availability of blood testing equipment 0.304*** 0.304*** 0.307*** 0.310*** 
 (0.0604) (0.0608) (0.0604) (0.0607) 
Availability of urine testing equipment -0.120 -0.126 -0.128 -0.115 
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) 
Waiting time to get patient card  -0.00212 -0.00238 -0.00236 -0.00252 
 (0.00468) (0.00465) (0.00467) (0.00466) 
Waiting time to see a medical professional  -0.00449** -0.00462** -0.00463** -0.00445** 
 (0.00214) (0.00215) (0.00215) (0.00215) 
Perceived quality of care 0.214*** 0.212*** 0.211*** 0.209*** 
 (0.0633) (0.0632) (0.0636) (0.0638) 
Community characteristics     
Region – Tigray (ref: SNNPR) 0.00736 0.00647 0.00245 0.00716 
 (0.126) (0.125) (0.126) (0.126) 
Region – Amhara 0.215* 0.211* 0.206* 0.213* 
 (0.118) (0.117) (0.118) (0.119) 
Region – Oromiya 0.237** 0.238** 0.236* 0.246** 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.121) (0.121) 
     
Observations 1,180 1,182 1,182 1,182 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1900 0.1884 0.1885 0.1925 
Log pseudo likelihood -643.878 -646.332 -646.297 -643.083 
Notes: Outcome variable is CBHI enrolment status in 2012 and all explanatory variables are at their 
baseline (2011) values; clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 
Single most important reason for (not) enrolling and intention to alter insurance 
status 
 
Insured households (N = 489) 
N 
(%) 
 
Uninsured households (N = 735) 
N 
(%) 
Reasons for enrolment (percent of insured households)  Reasons for not enrolling in CBHI (percent of 
uninsured but eligible households) 
 
Illness and/or injury occurs frequently in the household  39 
(8.1) 
Illness and injury does not occur frequently in 
the household  
31 
(5.2) 
Pregnant women in the household need health care services  34 
(7.0) 
The registration fee and premiums are not 
affordable  
203 
(34.2) 
Child/children in the households need health care services  37 
(7.7) 
Want to wait in order to confirm the benefit  117 
(19.7) 
To finance health care expenses  152 
(31.5) 
Lack of awareness about the scheme  133 
(22.4) 
The household is exempt from registration fee and premium  22 
(4.6) 
Shortage of money 32 
(5.4) 
Premium is low compared to user fee  120 
(24.8) 
Limited availability of health services  13 
(2.2) 
Pressure from CBHI officials  50 
(10.4) 
Quality of health care services is low  17 
(2.9) 
Other reasons 29 
(6.0) 
Other reasons   47 
  (7.9) 
Insured households who plan to renew their CBHI membership  466 
(96.1) 
Uninsured households who plan to enrol in the 
future   
 404                       
(57.1) 
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Table A1 
Description of explanatory variables 
Variable Description 
Socioeconomic status  
Consumption quintiles Classification of households based on monthly household consumption expenditure (in Birr) 
excluding health care spending (poorest quintile, 2nd quintile, 3rd quintile, 4th quintile, richest 
quintile) 
HH head education Education level of the household head (no education at all, informal education, primary or 
above) 
Participated in PSNP Household participated or still participates in productive safety net programme, PSNP 
(1=yes) 
Demographic traits  
Male headed hhd. Made headed household (1= yes) 
Age of hhd. head Age of the household head (in completed years) 
Household size Number of household members 
Prop. of children aged under 6 Proportion of children in the household aged under 6 years old 
Prop. of male aged 6 to 15 Proportion of males in the household aged between 6 to 15 years old 
Prop. of female aged 6 to 15 Proportion of females in the household aged between 6 to 15 years old 
Prop. of male aged 16 to 64 Proportion of males in the household aged between 16 to 64 years old 
Prop. of female aged 16 to 64 Proportion of females in the household aged between 16 to 64 years old 
Prop. of elderly aged above 64 Proportion of elderly in the household aged above 64 years old 
HH head religion The religion of the household head (Orthodox Christian, Protestant, Muslim, other religion 
or no religion) 
Health status and health care use   
Prop. of hhd members with good SAH Proportion of household members aged 6 years and above with good self-assessed health 
status (based on the perception of the respondent to the household survey) 
Prop. of hhd members with fair SAH Proportion of household members aged 6 years and above with fair self-assessed health 
status  (based on the perception of the respondent to the household survey) 
Prop. of hhd members with low SAH Proportion of household members aged 6 years and above with low self-assessed health 
status  (based on the perception of the respondent to the household survey) 
Past illness event Household, total number of days ill past two months 
Chronic disease Number of household members aged 6 and above years who suffered from a chronic 
disease (symptoms have been going on for more than 30 days) 
Outpatient care use At least one household member used outpatient care in the past two months (1= yes) 
Inpatient care use At least one household member used inpatient care in the past twelve months (1= yes) 
Duration of hospitalization cases Household, number of days spent in health facility in the past twelve months 
Outpatient healthcare expenditure Household’s health care spending  (in Birr) for outpatient care in the past two months  
Inpatient healthcare expenditure Household’s health care spending (in Birr) for inpatient care in the past twelve months 
Trust in modern heath care Modern health care providers can be trusted more than traditional healers (perception of the 
respondent to the household survey) (agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree) 
Formal and informal access to credit 
and networks 
 
Member of Iqqub At least one household member participates in an Iqqub association (1=yes) 
Member of credit & savings ass. At least one household member participates in credit & savings association (1=yes) 
Member of religious group At least one household member participates in a religious group (1=yes) 
Participates in Wonfel or Debo At least one household member participates in Wonfel or Debo (1=yes) 
Savings in bank account At least one household member has savings in a bank account (1=yes) 
Outstanding loan The household has an outstanding loan (1=yes) 
Some one to rely on  The household has someone to rely on at times of shock (1=yes) 
Official position held At least one household member held or still holds official, kebele, or traditional position 
(1=yes) 
Supply side characteristics  
Travel time to health center  Travel time to the nearest health center (in minutes) 
Travel time to public hospital  Travel time to the nearest public hospital (in minutes) 
Completed first degree (12+3) Head of the facility has at least completed a first medical degree (12+3) (1=yes) 
Received on the job training Head of the facility received on the job training (1=yes) 
Availability of blood testing equipment The health facility has blood testing equipment (1=yes) 
Availability of urine testing equipment The health facility has urine testing equipment (1=yes) 
Waiting time to get patient card  Average waiting time (in minutes) before getting patient card (based on the response of five 
patients interviewed after getting medical treatment from the health facility)  
Waiting time to see a medical 
professional  
Average waiting time (in minutes) to see a medical professional (Doctor, nurse) (based on 
the response of five patients interviewed after getting medical treatment from the health 
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Variable Description 
facility) 
Perceived quality of care Perception of the respondent (typically the head of the facility) about the overall quality of 
health care services provided by the facility (1=yes, the facility provides quality services) 
Community characteristics  
Region The region where the household is located (Tigray Region, Amhara Region, Oromiya 
Region, Southern Nations Nationalities and People's Region /SNNPR) 
Travel time to all weather road  Travel time to the nearest all weather road (in minutes) 
Travel time to asphalt road  Travel time to the nearest asphalt road (in minutes) 
Access to improved water The household has access to improved water from pipe to home, public tap, borehole in 
residence, public borehole or protected spring (1=yes) 
Access to modern light The household has access to light from electricity, generator or solar (1=yes) 
Radio use The household members use radio at least sometimes in a year (1=yes) 
Mobile phone use The household members use mobile at least sometimes in a year (1=yes) 
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Table A2 
Characteristics of target households per pilot region, 2011 
Variable  Tigray Amhara Oromiya  SNNPR 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Socioeconomic status         
Poorest consumption quintile 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.04 0.20 0.38 0.49 
2nd consumption quintile 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.42 0.11 0.31 0.22 0.41 
3rd consumption quintile 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.13 0.34 
4th consumption quintile 0.17 0.37 0.22 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.13 0.34 
Richest consumption quintile 0.19 0.39 0.13 0.33 0.35 0.48 0.13 0.34 
HH head education- No education at all 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.38 0.49 
HH head education - Informal  0.09 0.29 0.23 0.42 0.17 0.37 0.04 0.19 
HH head education - Primary or above  0.35 0.48 0.31 0.46 0.39 0.49 0.58 0.49 
Participates in PSNP 0.58 0.49 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.16 0.37 
Demographic traits         
Male headed HH  0.77 0.42 0.92 0.28 0.90 0.30 0.88 0.33 
Age of HH head 47.89 14.81 47.00 13.59 45.38 13.31 47.07 14.02 
Household size 5.32 2.47 5.67 2.08 5.97 2.08 6.51 2.25 
Prop. of children aged under 6 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.14 
Prop. of male aged 6 to 15 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.15 
Prop. of female aged 6 to 15 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.15 
Prop. of male aged 16 to 64 0.23 0.19 0.26 0.14 0.24 0.14 0.27 0.15 
Prop. of female aged 16 to 64 0.26 0.18 0.26 0.14 0.24 0.13 0.26 0.14 
Prop. of elderly aged above 64 0.08 0.21 0.05 0.14 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.11 
HH head religion - Orthodox Christian 0.98 0.13 0.66 0.47 0.65 0.48 0.13 0.33 
HH head religion - Protestant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.76 0.43 
HH head religion - Muslim 0.02 0.13 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.03 0.18 
HH head religion - Other religion or no 
religion 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.27 
Health status and health care use         
Prop. of household members with good 
SAH 
0.66 0.43 0.67 0.42 0.94 0.13 0.79 0.28 
Prop. of household members with fair 
SAH 
0.28 0.41 0.27 0.39 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.25 
Prop. of household members with low 
SAH 
0.06 0.19 0.05 0.16 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.14 
Past illness event 6.59 13.49 8.43 13.89 5.40 10.92 15.51 22.82 
Chronic illness 0.25 0.57 0.34 0.89 0.09 0.36 0.55 1.14 
Outpatient care use 0.29 0.45 0.38 0.49 0.28 0.45 0.58 0.50 
Inpatient care use 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19 
Duration of hospitalization cases 1.08 2.28 0.18 1.34 0.33 2.47 0.41 2.70 
Outpatient healthcare expenditure 27.51 147.23 71.36 352.08 47.10 139.07 83.88 163.37 
Inpatient healthcare expenditure 21.81 172.22 25.51 205.63 70.81 731.16 50.86 396.92 
Trust in modern care – Disagree 0.11 0.31 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19 
Trust in modern care - Neither agree nor 
disagree 
0.07 0.26 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.20 0.07 0.25 
Trust in modern care – Agree 0.82 0.38 0.93 0.25 0.92 0.28 0.90 0.31 
Formal and informal access to credit and 
networks  
        
Member of Iqqub 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.24 
Member of credit & savings ass. 0.02 0.15 0.26 0.44 0.10 0.31 0.10 0.31 
Member of religious group 0.75 0.43 0.58 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.63 0.48 
Participate in Wonfel or Debo 0.39 0.49 0.79 0.41 0.49 0.50 0.10 0.29 
Savings in bank account 0.14 0.35 0.26 0.44 0.08 0.28 0.06 0.24 
Outstanding loan 0.39 0.49 0.32 0.47 0.17 0.38 0.40 0.49 
Some one to rely on  0.36 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.20 0.40 
 32 
Variable  Tigray Amhara Oromiya  SNNPR 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Official position held 0.19 0.39 0.37 0.48 0.21 0.41 0.16 0.36 
Supply side characteristics         
Travel time to health center  74.57 54.90 74.09 50.42 67.62 35.32 49.48 29.45 
Travel time to public hospital  151.94 94.98 123.68 60.99 98.38 50.15 82.50 51.34 
Completed first degree (12+3) 0.72 0.45 0.39 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.17 0.37 
Received on the job training 0.56 0.50 0.72 0.45 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Availability of blood testing equipment 0.78 0.42 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.47 0.89 0.31 
Availability of urine testing equipment 0.78 0.42 0.83 0.37 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Waiting time to get patient card  19.58 13.83 13.19 13.38 7.03 3.82 12.16 9.72 
Waiting time to see a medical professional  57.78 35.38 38.83 25.22 15.37 8.56 25.74 11.57 
Perceived quality of care 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Community characteristics         
Travel time to all weather road  26.84 28.11 48.69 46.77 43.31 34.34 30.68 36.62 
Travel time to asphalt road  79.22 66.02 72.57 54.19 90.54 50.11 74.75 64.29 
Access to improved water 0.84 0.37 0.80 0.40 0.62 0.49 0.75 0.43 
Access to modern light 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.21 
Radio use 0.47 0.50 0.86 0.35 0.72 0.45 0.82 0.39 
Mobile phone use 0.33 0.47 0.52 0.50 0.38 0.49 0.37 0.48 
     
Observations 306 306 306 306 
 
